Both weighted and unweighted Borda manipulation problems have been proved N P-hard. However, there is no exact combinatorial algorithm known for these problems. In this paper, we initiate the study of exact combinatorial algorithms for both weighted and unweighted Borda manipulation problems. More precisely, we propose 
INTRODUCTION
Voting systems have many applications in a variety of areas, including political election, web spam reduction, multiagent planning, etc. The Borda system, proposed by JeanCharles de Borda in 1781 [7] , is one of the most significant voting systems. It is the prototype of scoring systems and many other voting systems. The Borda system has been used for selecting presidential election candidates in some of the Pacific island countries such as Nauru and Kiribati. It also has been shown that the Borda system is a powerful technique for pattern recognition.
Certain issues which have been attracting much attention in voting systems are the strategic behaviors, e.g., one or more than one voter to influence the outcome of the elections by doing some tricks. By the celebrated GibbardSatterthwaite Theorem [14, 19] , every reasonable voting system with at least three candidates can be attacked by the voters with providing insincere votes. However, from the viewpoint of complexity theory, if it is N P-hard to determine how to influence the election, one may give up his attacking to the election. From this point, computational complexity could be a reasonable way to protect elections from being attacked. The first study in this direction was conducted by Bartholdi et al. in their seminal paper [16] . Since then, researches on computational complexity of strategic behaviors of voting systems have been opened up (See [15, 20, 9, 6, 2] for more details). Recently, many N P-hard strategic behavior problems have been extensively studied from the view point of exact, exponential-time algorithms, for instance, manipulations [5] , bribery problems [8] , control problems [12] , etc. For more recent development in this direction, we refer to the excellent survey by Betzler et al. [1] . We focus on deriving exact combinatorial algorithms for weighted and unweighted Borda manipulation problems, both of which have been proved N P-hard [2, 6 ].
Preliminaries
A multiset S := {s1, s2, ..., s |S| } is a generalization of a set where objects of S are allowed to appear more than one time in S, that is, si = sj is allowed for i = j. An element of S is one copy of some object. We use s ∈+ S to denote that s is an element of S. The cardinality of S denoted by |S| is the number of elements contained in S. For example, the cardinality of the multiset {1, 1, 1, 2, 3, 3} is 6. For two multisets A and B, we use A B to denote the multiset containing all elements in A and B. For example, for A := {1, 1, 2, 3, 3, 4} and B := {1, 2, 3}, A B := {1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 4}.
Normally, a voting system can be specified by a set C of candidates, a multiset ΠV := {πv 1 , πv 2 , ..., πv n } of votes casted by a corresponding set V := {v1, v2, . . . , vn} of voters (πv i is casted by vi), and a voting protocol which maps the election (C, ΠV , V) to a candidate w ∈ C which we call the winner . Each vote πv ∈+ ΠV is defined by a bijection πv : C → [|C|] (in some other literature, a vote is defined as a linear order over the candidates), where [n] denotes the set {1, 2, ..., n}. The position of a candidate c in πv is the value of πv(c). We say a voter v placing a candidate c in his/her x-th position or a voter v fixing his/her x-th position by the candidate c if πv(c) = x. The candidate placed in the highest, that is, the |C|-th, position in πv is called the most preferred candidate of v, the candidate placed in the second-highest, that is, the (|C| − 1)-th, position in πv is called the second preferred candidate of v, and so on.
In the following, we use m to denote the number of candidates. A Borda protocol can be defined by a vector m − 1, m−2, ..., 0 . Each voter contributes m−1 score to his/her most preferred candidate, m − 2 score to his/her second preferred candidates, and so on. The winner is a candidate who has the highest total score. Here, we break a tie randomly, that is, if there is more than one candidate having the highest score, the winner will be chosen randomly from these candidates. In a weighted Borda system, each voter v is associated with a non-negative integer weight f (v) and contributes f (v)·(m−1) score to his/her most preferred candidate, f (v)·(m−2) score to his/her second preferred candidate, and so on. Accordingly, a candidate having the highest total score wins the election. The unweighted Borda system is the special case of the weighted Borda system where each voter has the unit weight of 1.
For a candidate c and a voter v, we use SCv(c) to denote the score of c which is contributed by v, that is, SCv(c) := f (v)·(πv(c)−1) (in an unweighted Borda system, SCv(c) := πv(c)−1). Let SCV (c) denote the total score of c contributed by voters in V, that is, SCV (c) := v∈V SCv(c).
In the settings of manipulation, we have, in addition to V, a set V of voters which are called manipulators. The manipulators form a coalition and desire to coordinate their votes to make a distinguished candidate win the new election with votes in ΠV Π V , where Π V is the multiset of votes casted by the manipulators. The formal definitions of the problems studied in this paper are as follows.
Unweighted Borda Manipulation (UBM)
Input: An election (C ∪ {p}, ΠV , V) where p is not the winner, and a set V of t manipulators.
Question: Can the manipulators cast their votes Π V in such a way that p wins the election (C ∪ {p}, ΠV Π V , V ∪ V )?
where p is not the winner, a set V of t manipulators and a weight function f2 : V → N.
Question: Can the manipulators cast their votes Π V in such a way that p wins the weighted election (C∪{p},
Since we break ties randomly, in order to make p the winner, the manipulators must assure that after the manipulation the distinguished candidate p becomes the only candidate who has the highest total score among all candidates.
Related Work and Our Contribution
As one of the most prominent voting systems, complexity of strategic behaviors under the Borda systems has been intensively studied. It is known that many types of bribery and control behaviors under the unweighted Borda system are N P-hard. For manipulation behaviors, WBM is N Phard even when the election contains only three candidates [5] . Bartholdi et al. [16] showed that both UBM and WBM in the case of only one manipulator are polynomial-time solvable. The complexity of UBM in the case of more than one manipulator remained open for many years, until very recently it was proved N P-hard even when restricted to the case of only two manipulators [2, 6] . Heuristic and approximation algorithms for UBM have been studied in the literature [23, 6] . It is worthy to mention that Zuckerman et al. [23] showed that UBM admits an approximation algorithm which can output a success manipulation with t + 1 manipulators whenever the given instance has a success manipulation with t manipulators. By applying the integer linear programming (ILP) techinique, UBM can be solved exactly with a very high computational complexity O * (m! O(m!) ) [2] . However, no purely combinatorial exact algorithm seems known for these problems. In particular, Betzler et al. [2] posed as an open problem whether UBM can be solved exactly with a running time single-exponentially depending on m in the case of constant number of manipulators.
We 
ALGORITHM FOR WEIGHTED BORDA MANIPULATION
In this section, we present an exact combinatorial algorithm for WBM. The following observation is clearly true. Observation 1. Every true-instance of WBM has a solution where each manipulator places the distinguished candidate p in his/her highest position.
Let ((C ∪ {p}, ΠV , V, f1), V , f2, t) be the given instance. Due to Observation 1, there must be a solution Π V with SC V∪V (p) := SCV (p) + v ∈V f (v ) · |C| if this instance is true. Therefore, to make p the winner, SC V (c) ≤ g(c) should be satisfied for all c ∈ C, where g(c) := SCV (p) + Reformulation of WBM Input: A set C of candidates associated with a capacity function g : C → N, and a multiset F := {f1, f2, ..., ft} of nonnegative integers.
Question: Is there a multiset Π := {π1, π2, ..., πt} of bijections mapping from C to [|C|] 
Here, the bijection πi corresponds to the vote casted by the i-th manipulator and fi ∈+ F corresponds to the weight of the i-th manipulator (suppose that a fixed ordering over the manipulators is given).
Our algorithm is based on a dynamic programming method which is associated with a boolean dynamic table defined as DT (C, Z1, Z2, ..., Zt), where C ⊆ C is a subset of candidates, Zi ⊆ [|C|] and |C| = |Zi| for all i ∈ [t]. Here, each Zi encodes the positions that are occupied by the candidates of C in the vote casted by the i-th manipulator. The entry DT (C, Z1, Z2, ..., Zt) = 1 means that there is a multiset Π = {π1, π2, ..., πt} of bijections mapping from C to [|C|] such that for each i ∈ [t], c∈C {πi(c)} = Zi and, for every candidate c ∈ C, c is "safe" under Π. Here, we say a candidate c is safe under Π, if Initialization: For all c ∈ C and z1, z2, ..., zt
, then DT ({c}, {z1}, {z2}, ..., {zt}) = 1; otherwise, DT ({c}, {z1}, {z2}, ..., {zt}) = 0. Updating: For each l from 2 to |C|, we update the entries DT (C, Z1, Z2, ..., Zt) with |C| = |Z1| = |Z2| = ... = |Zt| = l as follows: if ∃c ∈ C and ∃zi ∈ Zi for all i ∈ [t] such that DT (C \ {c}, Z1 \ {z1}, Z2 \ {z2}, ..., Zt \ {zt}) = 1 and DT ({c}, {z1}, {z2}, ..., {zt}) = 1, then DT (C, Z1, Z2, ..., Zt) = 1, otherwise, DT (C, Z1, Z2, ..., Zt) = 0.
Proof. We consider the above algorithm for WBM. In the initialization, we check whether
for each candidate c ∈ C and each encoded position zi ∈ [|C|] for each i ∈ [t]. Since there are |C| many candidates and |C| many positions to be considered for each zi, the running time of the initialization is bounded by O * (|C| t+1 ). In the recurrence, we compute DT (C, Z1, Z2, ..., Zt) for all C ⊆ C and all
To compute each of them, we consider all possibilities of c ∈ C and z1 ∈ Z1, z2 ∈ Z2, ..., zt ∈ Zt. For each possibility, we further check whether DT (C \ {c}, Z1 \ {z1}, Z2 \ {z2}, ..., Zt \ {zt}) = 1 and DT ({c}, {z1}, {z2}, ..., {zt}) = 1. Since there are at most |C| t+1 such possibilities, and there are at most 2 (t+1)|C| entries needed to be computed, we arrive at the total running time of 
ALGORITHM FOR UNWEIGHTED BORDA MANIPULATION
In this section, we study the UBM problem. Recall that UBM is a special case of WBM where all voters have the same unit weight. However, compared to the weighted version, when we compute SC V (c) for a candidate c, it is irrelevant which manipulators placed c in the j-th positions. The decisive factor is the number of manipulators placing c in the j-th positions. This leads to the following approach where we firstly reduce UBM to a matrix problem and then solve this matrix problem by a dynamic programming technique, resulting in a better running time than in Corollary 3. Firstly, the matrix problem is defined as follows.
.., gm} of non-negative integers and an integer t > 0.
In the following, we present an algorithm for FMM. The algorithm is based on a dynamic programming method associated with a boolean dynamic table 
Initialization: For each possible multisets
Updating: For each l from 2 to t and each possible multiset
Proof. In the initialization, we consider all possible mul-
Since T has at most t m possibilities, the running time of the initialization is bounded by O * (t m ). In the recurrence, we use a loop indicated by a variable l with 2 ≤ l ≤ m to update DT (l, T ). In each loop we compute the values of the entries DT (l, T ) for all multisets T := {Tj ∈ N | j ∈ [m], Tj ≤ t}. To compute each of the entries, we check whether
Since there are at most t m possible multisets T , the time to compute each DT (l, T ) is bounded by O * (t m ). Since T has at most t m possibilities, there are at most t m entries needed to be computed in each loop, implying a total time of O * (t 2m ) for recurrence procedure. In conclusion, the total time of the algorithm is O * (t 2m ). The correctness directly follows from the meaning we defined for the dynamic table.
We now come to show how to solve UBM via FMM. A partial vote is a partial injection π : C ∪ {p} → [|C ∪ {p}|] which maps a subset C ⊆ C ∪ {p} onto [|C ∪ {p}|] such that for any two distinct a1, a2 ∈ C, π(a1) = π(a2). Here, C is the domain and {π(a) | a ∈ C} is the codomain of π. A position not in the codomain is called a free position. For simplicity, we define π(c) = −1 for c ∈ C.
Lemma 5. UBM can be reduced to FMM in polynomial time.
Proof Sketch. Let Γ := ((C ∪ {p}, ΠV , V), V , t) be an instance of UBM. By Observation 1, we know that if Γ is a true-instance there must be a solution Π V such that each manipulator places p in his/her highest position. We assume that SCV (p)+t·|C|−SCV (c)−1 ≥ 0 for all c ∈ C as discussed in Section 2. Let (c1, c2, ..., c |C| ) be any arbitrary ordering of C. We construct an instance Γ := (t, g) of FMM where t has the same value as in Γ and g := {g1, g2, ..., g |C| } with
. It is clear that the construction takes polynomial time. In the following, we prove that Γ is a true-instance if and only if Γ is a true-instance.
⇒: Given a solution Π V for Γ, we can get a solution for Γ by setting 
Algorithm for constructing a solution for Γ from Γ
Step 1 Initialize Π V := {π1, π2, ..., πt} of partial votes such that each partial vote has empty domain;
Step 3 Forj = |C| to 1, do
Step 3.1 While ∃πz where thej-th position is free, do
Step 3.1.1 Let ci be any candidate with ci j ;
Step 3.1.2 If πz(ci) = −1, then set πz(ci) =j;
Step 3.1.3 Else, let j = πz(ci) and let π z be a vote with π z (ci) = −1; Step 3.1.3.1 If thej-th position of π z is free, then set π z (ci) =j Step 3.1.3.2 Else
Step 3.1.3.2.1 While ∃j >j with π
Step 3.1.3.2.1.2 Let j = j ;
Step Step
[j] = t and there are exactly t manipulators, there must be a candidate ci with ci j whenever there is a vote whosej-th position is free, which guarantees the soundness of Step 3.1.1. Similarly, there must be a π z with π z (ci) = −1 in Step 3.1.3, since, otherwise, Obviously, such a constructed Π V corresponds to a solution for UBM: for each candidate ci ∈ C,
To analysis the running time of the algorithm, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 6. Each execution of the "while" loop in Step 3.1.3.2.1 takes polynomial time.
Proof. To prove the lemma, we construct an auxiliary bipartite graph B with C z as the left-hand vertices and Cz as the right-hand vertices, where C z and Cz are the sets of candidates which have been placed by π z and πz in somē j>-th position (a j>-th position is a position higher than the j-th position), respectively. Two vertices are adjacent if and only if they represent the same candidate (as the vertices linked by a gray line in Figure 1 ) or they were placed in the same (but not identity) positions (as the vertices linked by a black line in Figure 1 ). We observe that the constructed auxiliary graph has maximum degree two. Since C z \ Cz is not empty, there is a simple path P := (ca 1 , ca 2 , ..., ca x ) with ca 1 = ci and ca x ∈ C z \ Cz. It is clear that each execution of the "while" loop corresponds to the following switching processing: switching the positions of a k and a k+1 for all k = 1, 3, ..., x − 1 (since ca 1 = ci ∈ Cz and ca x ∈ C z , x is even). The lemma follows from the truth that the length of the simple path is bounded by 2|C|.
We now analysis the running time. The algorithm has three loops. The "for" loop in Step 3 has |C| rounds. The "while" loop in Step 3.1 has at most t rounds since each execution of the loop fixes a free position for some πz. Due to Lemma 6, the "while" loop in Step 3.1.3.2.1 takes polynomial time. Summery all above, the running time of the algorithm is polynomially in t and |C|, which complete the proof.
Due to Lemmas 4 and 5, we get the following theorem.
Next we show that FMM can be solved by an integer linear programming (ILP) based algorithm. The ILP contains m 2 variables xij for i, j ∈ [m] and, subject to the following restrictions
where t ∈ N and g := {g 1 , g 2 , . . . , gm} with gi ∈ N for all i ∈ [m] are input.
H. W. Lenstra [18] proposed an O * (ζ O(ζ) )-time algorithm for solving ILP with ζ variables. The running time was then improved by R. Kannan [17] . 
BORDA MANIPULATION UNDER SINGLE-PEAKED ELECTIONS
The single-peaked election was introduced by D. Black in 1948 [3] . The complexity of many voting problems under single-peaked elections has been studied in the literature [11, 4, 13] . It turns out that many N P-hard problems become polynomial-time solvable when restricted to single-peaked elections [4, 13] .
Given a set C of candidates and a bijection L : C → [|C|], we say that a vote πv : C → [|C|] is coincident with L if and only if for any three distinct candidates a,
The candidate having the highest value of πv(·) is called the peak of πv with respect to L. An election (C, ΠV , V) is a single-peaked election if there exists a bijection L : C → [|C|] such that all votes of ΠV are coincident with L. We call such a bijection L a harmonious order of (C, ΠV , V). See Fig. 2 for a concrete example of single-peaked elections.
It has been shown in [10] that one can test whether a given election is a single-peaked election in polynomial time. Moreover, a harmonious order can be found in polynomial time if the given election is a single-peaked election. The harmonious order L is
Here, πv 1 is illustrated by the dark line, πv 2 is illustrated by the gray line and πv 3 is illustrated by the dotted line.
For a manipulation problem under single-peaked elections, we are given a single-peaked election (C ∪ {p}, ΠV , V), a harmonious order L, and a set V of manipulators. We are asked whether the manipulators can cast their votes Π V in such a way that all their votes are coincident with L and p wins the election (C ∪ {p}, ΠV Π V , V ∪ V ) [22] . In the following, let UBM1SP and UBM2SP denote the problems of UBM with only one manipulator and with exactly two manipulators under single peaked elections, respectively.
It is known that the unweighted Borda manipulation problem is polynomial-time solvable with one manipulator [16] but becomes N P-hard with two manipulators [2, 6] . Here, we show that this problem with two manipulators can be solved in polynomial time in single-peaked elections.
Theorem 10. Both UBM1SP and UBM2SP are polynomialtime solvable.
All remaining parts of this section are devoted to prove Theorem 10. To this end, let (C ∪ {p}, ΠV , V) be the given single-peaked election and L be a harmonious order of (C ∪ {p}, ΠV , V). Let (la, la−1, ..., l1, p, r1, r2, ..., r b ) be an order-
, and let CL := {la, la−1, ..., l1} and CR := {r1, r2, ..., r b }.
For two partial votes π1 with domain C1 and π2 with domain C2, we say π1 and π2 are comparable if for every c ∈ C1 ∩ C2, π1(c) = π2(c). Furthermore, for such comparable partial votes π1 and π2, let π1 π2 denote the partial vote π with domain C1 ∪ C2 such that π(c) = π1(c) for all c ∈ C1 and π(c) = π2(c) for all c ∈ C2.
For a partial vote π with domain C and a vote π , we say π is extendable to π if for any a ∈ C, π(a) = π (a).
The definition of single-peaked elections directly implies the following observation. The righthand shows the recasted vote π π with πv(p) > πv(l1) > πv(l2) > πv(l3) > πv(r1) > πv(l4) > πv(l5) > πv(r2) > πv(r3) > πv(l6).
Here Csmall = {l4, l5, l6, r1, r2, r3}, π has domain {p, l1, l2, l3} and codomain {10, 9, 8, 7}, and π has domain {r1, l4, l5, r2, r3, l6} and codomain {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}.
Observation 11. Let L be a harmonious order, πv be a vote which is coincident with L and c be the peak of πv, then for any c1, c2
Lemma 12. Every true-instance of UBM under singlepeaked elections has a solution where every manipulator places the distinguished candidate p in his/her highest position.
Proof. Assume that Π V is a solution that contradicts the claim of the lemma, and v is a manipulator who did not place p in his/her highest position. Without loss of generality, assume that CR = ∅, CL = ∅ and v placed some li in his/her highest position. Let a := |CL| and b := |CR|. Due to Observation 11, πv(p) > πv(r1) > πv(r2) >, ..., > πv(r b ). We consider two cases. The first case is that for any l ∈ CL, πv(l) > πv(p). In this case, we can create a new solution by recasting πv with πv(p) > πv(l1) > πv(l2) > , ..., > πv(la) > πv(r1) > πv(r2) >, ..., > πv(r b ). The second case is that there is a l ∈ CL with πv(l) < πv(p). In this case, there must be a z ∈ [a] such that πv(lj) > πv(p) for all j ∈ [z − 1] and πv(lj) < πv(p) for all a ≥ j ≥ z. Let C small := CR ∪ {lz, lz+1, ..., la}. We can get a new solution by recasting πv with π π , where π is the partial vote with domain (C ∪{p})\C small and codomain {|C ∪{p}|, |C ∪{p}|− 1, ..., |C small | + 1} such that π (p) > π (l1) > π (l2) >, ..., > π (lz−1), and π is the partial vote which has domain C small and is extendable to the original vote πv. Fig. 3 illustrates such a case.
For a subset C of candidates and a bijection L : C ∪ {p} → [|C∪{p}|], we say that the candidates in C lie consecutively in L if and only if there are no c1, c2 ∈ C and c ∈ (C ∪ {p}) \ C such that L(c1) < L(c) < L(c2). If C contains only two candidates c1 and c2, then we say c1 and c2 lie consecutively in
The following lemma has been proven in [21] [Theorem 1].
, π is coincident with L if and only if for any integer j with 1 ≤ j ≤ |C|, all candidates in the set {c ∈ C ∪ {p} | π(c) ≥ j} lie consecutively in L.
The following observation directly follows from the above lemma.
Observation 14. Let π be a vote with p as the peak. L is the harmonious order of the given election and CL, CR are defined as above. Then, π is coincident with L if and only if for all li, l i ∈ CL (resp. rj, r j ∈ CR), i < i (resp. j < j ) implies π(li) > π(l i ) (resp. π(rj) > π(r j )).
Algorithm for UBM1SP
For two distinct candidates c, c ∈ C ∪ {p}, we say c and c are neighbors if |L(c) − L(c )| = 1. Let N (c) denote the set of neighbors of c. Clearly, every candidate has at most two neighbors. A block is a subset of candidates lying consecutively in L. For a block S ⊆ C ∪ {p}, let N (S) := {c ∈ (C ∪ {p}) \ S | ∃c ∈ S with c ∈ N (c )}. It is easy to verify that |N (S)| ≤ 2 for every block S.
Note that the polynomial-time algorithm for the general Borda manipulation problem with one manipulator proposed in [16] cannot be directly used for solving UBM1SP, since UBM1SP requires that the manipulator's vote should be single-peaked. Our polynomial-time algorithm for UBM1SP is a slightly modified version of the algorithm in [16] . Basically, the algorithm places candidates one-by-one in the positions of the manipulator's vote, from the highest to the lowest. The currently highest, unoccupied position of the vote is called the "next free position". The details of the algorithm is as follows: (1) Place p in the highest position; (2) Set S = {p}, where the block S is used to store all candidates which have been placed in some positions by the manipulator; (3) If none of N (S) can be "safely" placed in the next free position, then return "No". A candidate c can be safely placed in the j-th position of the manipulator if SCV (c) + j − 1 < SCV (p) + |C|. The final score of p is clearly SCV (p) + |C|. (4) Otherwise, place a candidate c ∈ N (S), which can be safely placed in the next free position, in the next free position and set S := S ∪ {c}. If S = C ∪ {p}, return "Yes", otherwise, go back to step (3) . Clearly, the above algorithm needs O(m) time, where m is the number of candidates: Each iteration extends the block S by adding one new candidate to S. Since S can be extended at most |C| times and each iteration takes constant time, the total time is bounded by O(m). The correctness of the above algorithm is easy to verify by Lemma 12 and Lemma 13.
Algorithm for UBM2SP
The algorithm for UBM2SP is similar to the one for UBM1SP: Greedily fill free positions of both manipulators until no free position remains or no candidate can be safely placed in a next free position.
Main Idea: Let π1 and π2 be the votes of the two manipulators v1 and v2. We use S1 and S2 to denote the sets of candidates that are already placed in some positions of π1 and π2, respectively. At the beginning, S1 = S2 = {p} and we then iteratively extend S1 and S2 by placing candidates in π1 and π2. After each iteration, we will assure the invariant that S1 = S2 and S1 is a block of L. In each iteration, define S = S1 = S2 and let l and r be the two neighbors of S in L. In order to keep π1 and π2 single-peaked, there are only two cases to consider: First, both next free positions of π1 and π2 are occupied by one of l and r; Second, l is placed in the next free position of one of π1 and π2, and r is placed in the next free position of the other. If we have c ∈ {l, r} satisfying SCV (c) + 2α < SCV (p) + 2|C|, where α is the score contributed by one of π1 and π2 with placing c in its next free position, then we prefer the first case, set S1 := S1 ∪ {c} and S2 := S2 ∪ {c}, and proceed with the next iteration. Otherwise, we check whether the second case is "safe", that is, SCV (r) + α < SCV (p) + 2|C| and SCV (l) + α < SCV (p) + 2|C|. If not, then the given instance is a false-instance; otherwise, S1 := S1 ∪ {l} and S2 := S2 ∪ {r}. Next, we have to restore the invariant that S1 = S2. Observe that S1, S2, and S1 ∩ S2 all are blocks in L. Moreover, S1 \ S2 and S2 \ S1 form two blocks and both are neighbors to S1 ∩ S2. We apply here another iteration to consider the candidates in S1\S2 (or S2\S1) one-by-one. For each of them in S1 \S2 (or S2 \S1), we place it in the highest safe position in π2 (or π1) and fill the "gaps" that are consecutive free positions with candidates not in S1 ∪ S2. More details refer to Step 2.4 of the algorithm ALGO-UBM2SP.
For simplicity, we define some new notations. For a candidate c and an integer s with 1 ≤ s ≤ |C|, we use c → s (or c → s) to denote that c can (or cannot) be safely placed in the (|C| + 1 − s)-th position of some manipulator. We also use c → {s1, s2} (or c → {s1, s2}) to denote that c can (or cannot) be safely placed in the (|C| + 1 − s1)-th position of one manipulator and in the (|C| + 1 − s2)-th position of the other, simultaneously. For a block Si corresponding to a manipulator vi with i = 1, 2 and a candidate c ∈ N (Si), we use extend(Si, c) to denote the following operations: (1) place c in the next free position of πi, that is, set πi(c) = |C|+1−|Si|; and (2) extend Si with Si := Si ∪ {c}.
The algorithm ALGO-UBM2SP for UBM2SP:
Step 1 Both manipulators place p in their highest positions. Set S1 = S2 = {p}.
Step 2. While S1 = S2 = C ∪ {p}, do let S = S1
Step 2.1 If ∃c ∈ N (S) with c → {|S|, |S|}, then extend(S1, c) and extend(S2, c); Step End While 2.4
Step End While 2
Step 3 Return "Yes".
To show the correctness of the algorithm, we need the following lemma. For a vote π and two integers x ≤ x with
CL if c ∈ CR CR if c ∈ CL Lemma 15. Let {π1, π2} be a solution for UBM2SP, and c ∈ C be a candidate with π1(c) = x and π2(c) = y. If there are two integers x , y such that (1) x > x, y > y; (2) −c) , then, the following two votes π 1 , π 2 with
Proof. We can transfer π1 to π 1 by continually switching the position of c and the position of the candidate c with π1(c ) = π1(c) + 1, until c is moved to the x -th position. Since c ∈ C(L, −c), due to Observation 14, each switching will not change a vote which is coincident with L to a vote which is not coincident with L. By the same way, we can transfer π2 to π 2 such that π 2 is coincident with L. Since SCV (c) + x + y − 2 < SCV (c) + 2|C|, and each switch does not increase the total scores of any other candidates, {π 1 , π 2 } must be a solution.
We now come to show the correctness of the algorithm. We say two partial votes π1, π2 with domain S1, S2 with |S1| ≤ |S2|, respectively, are extendable to a solution, if there is a solution {π 1 , π 2 } such that {π Proof Sketch. Firstly, we consider the correctness. In each step, the algorithm extends S1 (or S2) by adding a candidate from N (S1) (or N (S2)) to S1 (or S2), which makes S1 (or S2) always be a block. Due to Lemma 13, if the algorithm returns "Yes", the two votes π1 and π2 must be coincident with L. We need the following observations. Observation 17. If at some point S1 = S2 = S, π1, π2 are extendable to a solution, and a candidate c ∈ N (S) satisfies c → {|S|, |S|}, then the partial votes π 1 with π 1 (c ) = π1(c ) for c ∈ S and π 1 (c) = |C| + 1 − |S| and π 2 with π 2 (c ) = π2(c ) for c ∈ S and π 2 (c) = |C| + 1 − |S| are extendable to a solution.
Observation 18. If at some point S1 = S2 = S with N (S) = {l, r}, π1, π2 are extendable to a solution, no candidate c ∈ N (S) satisfies c → {|S|, |S|}, and l → |S| and r → |S|, then, the partial votes π 1 with π 1 (c ) = π1(c ) for c ∈ S and π 1 (l) = |C| + 1 − |S| and π 2 with π 2 (c ) = π2(c ) for c ∈ S and π 2 (r) = |C| + 1 − |S| are extendable to a solution.
Observation 19. If at some point two partial votes π1 and π2 with domains S1 and S2, respectively, are extendable to a solution and there is a candidate c which has been placed in some position in πi (but has not been placed by the other vote, that is, π3−i), where i = 1 or i = 2, then, the partial votes πi and π with π (c ) = π 3−i (c ) for c ∈ S3−i, and π (c) = min{SCV (p) + 2|C| − SCV (c) − πi(c) + 1, |C| + 1 − |S3−i|} are extendable to a solution.
The correctness of the above observations follows from Lemma 15.
Due to Lemma 12, Step 1 is correct. Then, we consider the while loop in Step 2. Due to Observation 17, if Step 2.1 was executed and the given instance is a true-instance, then, the partial votes after the execution of Step 2.1 must be extendable to a solution. Otherwise, if Step 2.1 was not executed, and N (S) contains only one candidate, then the given instance must be a false-instance as described in the comments of Step 2.2. Finally, if the extend operations in Step 2.3 was executed, then, due to Observation ??, these operations are correct. If Step 2.3 returns "No", then the given instance must be a false-instance. The reason for this is that, due to Lemma 13 and Observation ??, if the given instance is a true-instance, then π1, π2 must be extendable to a solution and thus, the next free positions must be occupied by N (S). If the conditions of Steps 2.1 to 2.3 are not satisfied, the next free positions can not be safely placed, then we can return "No". After the execution of extend operations in Step 2.3, S1 = S2, and the algorithm then goes to the while loop in Step 2.4. Since S1 ∩S2 = ∅ (at least p ∈ S1 ∩S2) and both S1 and S2 are blocks (this is easy to check by the definition of extend), there must be at least one candidate c ∈ N (S1 ∩S2) which has already been placed in a position by a manipulator v ∈ {v1, v2}. Due to Observation ??, if the given instance is a true-instance, then we can place c in the position y = min{SCV (p) + 2|C| − SCV (c) − πi(c) + 1, |C| + 1 − |Sz|}, where i = 1, z = 2 if v = v1 and i = 2, z = 1 if v = v2, to get partial votes which are extendable to a solution. Due to Lemma 13, all free positions higher than the y-th position can only fixed by candidates from C(L, −c) \ Sz, and each of these free positions is fixed by an unique candidate from C(L, −c) \ Sz. These are exactly what the while loop in 2.4.2 does: fixing the free positions which are higher than the yth position one-by one. After the loop, Step 2.4.3 places c in the y-th position. However, if |C(L, −c) \ Sz| is less than the number of free positions which are higher than the y-th position, then due to Lemma 13, the given instance must be a false-instance. Due to the above analysis, each case of Steps 2.1 to 2.4 correctly extends the partial votes to two new partial votes which are also extendable to a solution, or correctly returns "No".
To analyze the running time, we need to consider how many times Steps 2.1, 2.3, 2.4.1, 2.4.2.2, 2.4.3 are executed. For simplicity, let n λ denote the number of times that Step λ is executed throughout the algorithm. It is clear that n2.4.1 = n2.4.3. Since each execution of Steps 2.1, 2.3, 2.4.2.2, 2.4.3 extends at least one of S1 and S2 by adding a new candidate to the block or terminates the algorithm, and both S1 and S2 can be extended at most 2|C| times, we conclude that n2.1 +n2.3 +n2.4.1 +n2.4.2.2 +n2.4.3 = O(|C|). Since each execution of these Steps needs constant time 2 , we arrive at a total running time of O(|C|).
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we initiate the study of exact combinatorial algorithms for Borda manipulation problems. We propose two exact combinatorial algorithms with running times O * ((m · 2 m ) t+1 ) and O * (t 2m ) for WBM and UBM, respectively, where t is the number of manipulators and m is the number of candidates in the given election. These results answer an open problem posed by Betzler et al. [2] . In addition, we present an integer linear programming based algorithm with running time O * (2 9m 2 log m ) for UBM. Finally, we study UBM under single-peaked elections and propose polynomial-time algorithms for UBM in case of no more than two manipulators. We mention here that all our algorithms can be used with slight modifications for (positional) scoring systems.
One future direction could be to improve the presented combinatorial algorithms. Parameterized complexity has been proved a powerful tool to handle N P-hard problems. As showed here and in [2] , UBM is fixed-parameter tractable with respect to the number m of candidates. A challenging work is to improve the running time to O * (2 m log m ), or even O * (c m ) with c being a constant. Furthermore, the complexity of UBM in the case of more than two manipulators under single-peaked elections remains open.
